to obtain in the world. The semantic thesis is descriptivism about epistemic modal discourse. Descriptivism is the idea that epistemic modal talk serves fundamentally to describe reality, to say how the world, or some aspect of the world, is.
The thesis of this paper is that the standard view is mistaken. Though from a distance it may seem that epistemic modal discourse can be treated descriptively, observation at close range reveals serious in-principle obstacles to descriptive analysis. I will argue that there are elementary facts about the semantic behavior of epistemic modal operators that cannot be accommodated plausibly along descriptivist, factualist lines. Together with a number of pragmatic anomalies unembedded epistemic modal claims are now well-known to give rise to, the facts will motivate the development of a nonfactualist, nondescriptivist alternative. With caveats to be provided in due course, the positive account to be set out could plausibly be called a kind of expressivism about epistemic modal discourse.
I begin by setting out the standard factualist/descriptivist picture in more detail and by providing some specific examples of the descriptivist account of epistemic modal discourse. After that I make the case against the standard view. The positive account begins in section 6 ('States of mind'), and its development occupies the rest of the paper.
Descriptivism about epistemic modals
Loosely speaking, descriptivism about epistemic modal discourse is what you get when you begin with factualism about epistemic modality and semantically ascend. Semantic ascent affords a better view of the dialectical terrain, so much of my discussion will be keyed to the descriptivist reading of the standard view. Descriptivism, I already said, is the view that epistemic modal talk serves to describe reality. Let me now clarify 'epistemic modal talk' and 'serves to describe reality'.
By 'epistemic modal talk', I have in mind clauses that are modalized with natural language epistemic modal operators. For instance, 'It is possible that is raining', 'It might be raining', 'It could be raining', 'It is probably raining', 'It is likely that it is raining', and 'It must be raining' all have readings on which the modals they contain are interpreted epistemically. (With 'might', 'likely', and 'probably', the epistemic reading is typically the preferred reading, if not the only reading; with 'could', 'possible', and 'must', other readings, such as a deontic reading, are typically easy to get.) I don't attempt an operational definition of this class of modals now; it is our eventual project to provide a theory which delimits the class more precisely. Only let me be explicit that by 'epistemic modal operator', I don't have in mind complex operators such as 'for all I know, it might be that'-operators with simple epistemic modals scoped under epistemic attitude verbs. The importance of excluding these complex operators will become clear later. I will avoid interactions with tense, restricting myself to the case where these modals take present-tensed complements.
By 'serves to describe reality', I mean that epistemic modalized clauses serve to represent the world, or one's situation in the world, as being a certain way. More precisely: I mean that, relative to context, the semantic content of the clause determines, and is understood as determining, a condition on possible worlds or situations. The informational content of the clause has the effect of dividing the space of possible ways things might be into those which conform, and those which fail to conform, with how things are represented as being. Let me call a set of truth-conditions which serve to divide the space of possible worlds or situations factualist truth-conditions. A descriptivist provides factualist truth-conditions for epistemic modal talk.
I hope descriptivism sounds like the straightforward view it is. Some examples of descriptivist views will help to round out the picture. Start with descriptivism about epistemic possibility modals. G. E. Moore writes:
People in philosophy say: The propositions that I'm not sitting down now, that I'm not male, that I'm dead, that I died before the murder of Julius Caesar, that I shall die before 12 tonight are 'logically possible'. But it's not English to say, with this meaning: It's possible that I'm not sitting down now etc.-this only means 'It is not certain that I am' or 'I don't know that I am'. [Moore, 1962, p. 184] Moore's view is descriptivist simply because according to it, epistemic possibility sentences in context are descriptions of the epistemic state of some agent in the world. Most descriptivists agree with Moore's basic idea, that these sentences serve to describe the epistemic situation of some agent or agents. The internal debate among descriptivists concerns the detailed nature of the description-for instance, which agents matter, or what aspect of the agents' evidential situation are relevant. For example, three or four epicycles of analysis down from Moore, DeRose proposes that S's assertion "It is possible that P" is true if and only if (1) no member of the relevant community knows that P is false, and (2) there is no relevant way by which members of the relevant community can come to know that P is false [DeRose, 1991, p. 593-4] while Stanley suggests that these sentences describe the epistemic state of some contextually given knower A:
It is possible A that p is true if and only if what A knows does not, in a manner that is obvious to A, entail not-p. [Stanley, 2005, p. 128] The particular motivations for these departures from Moore's position needn't detain us. The point is just that, although Moore, DeRose, and Stanley all differ on exactly what facts epistemic possibility sentences describe, they all agree that these sentences serve to describe some facts or other, some feature of the world.
There you have examples of descriptivism about epistemic possibility. What about epistemic necessity? If, as is widely assumed, epistemic necessity modals ( ) are the logical duals of epistemic possibility modals ( ) in the sense that φ ↔ ¬ ¬φ then each of the above accounts of epistemic possibility straightforwardly generates an account of epistemic necessity. So, given duality, Moore's view would be that 'It must raining', on the epistemic reading, is true just when 'I know it's raining' is; and so on for the other two views. It should be clear that the resulting positions on epistemic necessity are no less descriptivist than the positions on epistemic possibility they are constructed from. The duality of epistemic possibility and necessity is extremely plausible; I will assume it throughout.
Last, probability operators such as 'probably' and 'it is likely that', which I will abbreviate as ' '. Here, a simplistic example of a descriptivist position can be abstracted from the Bayesian paradigm: for one to say 'It's probably raining' is for one to say that one's credence in rain is above one-half, or above some contextually-determined value.
1 In calling something 'probable', one describes one's credal state. A second position, closer in form to the descriptivist accounts of (non-probabilistic) epistemic modality just described, adverts to some tacit body of knowledge or evidence. Suppose a body of evidence induces, or is representable by, a probability measure over a domain of propositions. Then instances of φ can be understood to say that the proposition that φ has some highish value according to the measure induced by the body of evidence determined by the context in which the sentence is uttered. They would, in short, be factual claims about some contextually determined body of evidence in the world.
Descriptivism requires no fundamentally new semantic or pragmatic assumptions. Semantically, we can compositionally assign epistemic modal clauses possible worlds truth-conditions (or centered worlds truth-conditions) in perfectly ordinary fashion. (The standard semantics is Kratzer's: see Kratzer [1977 Kratzer [ , 1981 Kratzer [ , 1991 ; see also Lewis [1979] .) Pragmatically, too, we needn't make waves. We can retain a familiar picture of communication, a picture that gives no special place to epistemic modal talk. Whether I say that it is raining or I say that it is probably raining, the story about what is happening, at least in straightforward cases, can be the usual Gricean one: I believe myself to have some information, and wish to impart it to you; I say something whose truth turns on whether this information is true, presuming common knowledge of the language; in so doing I intend for you to come to accept that information, acting with the expectation that my intention to communicate that information is mutually recognized. More needs to be said to fill in the details, of course; but suffice to say that, for the descriptivist, the details will be filled in just the same ways for epistemic and non-epistemic modal talk alike.
Because descriptivism makes no semantic or pragmatic waves, there is a presumption in favor of it. In the next three sections I attempt to defeat this presumption, by describing some phenomena not amenable to descriptivist explanation.
Epistemic contradictions
Notice that the following sentences sound awful.
(1) # It's raining and it might not be raining.
(2) # It's raining and it probably isn't raining.
Let us call sentences like these-sentences of the schematic form (φ ∧ E¬φ), where E is an epistemic modal-epistemic contradictions.
2 Why do epistemic contradictions (1) and (2) sound awful?
At first glance, a descriptivist explanation seems easy enough. A descriptivist might try saying that these sentences sound terrible because, thanks to the semantics of the epistemic modals, these sentences both truth-conditionally entail (3) # It's raining and I don't know its raining. relative to context. Obviously, (3) is Moore-paradoxical. Therefore, says the descriptivist, (1) and (2) should be pragmatically defective in whatever way (3) is defective. The defect in (1) and (2) is parasitic, as it were, on (3). Epistemic contradictions are not contradictions in any semantic sense. They are just Moore-paradoxical sentences in new guise.
The situation is not so simple, however.
(1) and (2) are more than merely pragmatically defective. The conjuncts in these sentences are incompatible in a more robust sense. We can see this when we attempt to embed these conjunctions into larger constructions. Consider, for instance, the imperatives: (4) # Suppose it's raining and it might not be raining.
(5) # Suppose it's raining and it probably isn't raining.
These imperatives make no sense. The fact that they do not make sense is not explained by the assumption that the conjunctions they each embed both truthconditionally entail (3), because (3) is perfectly easy to embed under 'suppose': (6) Suppose it's raining and I don't know its raining.
(Indeed, the intelligibility of sentences like (6) is a popular motivation for denying that classically Moore-paradoxical sentences are contradictions in any semantically rich sense.) Or again, epistemic contradictions never sound acceptable in the antecedent position of a indicative conditional:
(7) # If it's raining and it might not be raining, then...
(8) # If it's raining and it probably isn't raining, then... Conditionals that begin in this way seem beyond repair. But Moore-paradoxical sentences are acceptable in this environment: (9) If it's raining and I don't know it, then I will get wet.
Compare that with the nonsensical (10) # If it's raining and it might not be raining, then I will get wet.
The conditional (10) is particularly telling. If it really were the case that, relative to context, 'It might not be raining' entailed 'I don't know that it's raining', we would expect (10) to be about as acceptable as (9). But the difference in acceptability could hardly be greater.
The upshot is this. Epistemic contradictions 'take their badness with them', as it were, into the embedded contexts described above. Moore-paradoxical sentences do not. The defect in sentences which embed epistemic contradictions is therefore not parasitic on Moore's paradox. It must be explained in some other way.
And the problem is that is not at all clear how to explain it plausibly along descriptivist lines. Descriptivists want to tell us that epistemic contradictions such as (1) and (2) above have factualist truth-conditions. In particular, they want to tell us that these sentences have non-empty factualist truth conditions, truth-conditions that obtain in some possible situation.
3 If the truth-conditions of (e.g.) 'It isn't raining and it might be raining' are non-empty, however, it seems there should be nothing at all preventing us from hypothetically entertaining the obtaining of these conditions. We ought to be able to consider such a possibility simply as a matter of semantic competence. But we can't. Evidently there is no coherent way to entertain the thought that it isn't raining and it might be raining. Descriptivists fail to predict this.
It is not hard to see why. According to standard versions of descriptivism, the truth-conditions for (1) have the following schematic structure: 'It's raining and it might not be raining', uttered at c, is true in w just in case (i) It's raining in w; and (ii) Some select epistemic state or body of evidence in w is thus and so in w
Descriptivists differ on how to precisify (ii), as we saw above. But on any plausible way of precisifying it, the result will be truth-conditions for (1) which obtain in some possible situations, possible situations which should be straightforward to hypothetically entertain. That, again, is the wrong prediction, because 'It's raining and it might not be raining' is not trivial to entertain-true. Indeed, plausibly it is impossible to entertain-true. That is why it sounds incoherent for me to ask you to entertain it, as in (4) above. The result is that descriptivism predict coherence for constructions such as (4), whereas incoherence is what we find. All this may be repeated, mutatis mutandis, for (2), which trades the epistemic possibility modal for the probability operator 'probably'. Let me emphasize that the problem I have described is not due to particular features of what have called 'standard' descriptivism. That is, the problem is not just a problem for those versions of descriptivism which takes epistemic possibility clauses to be descriptions of epistemic states or states of evidence. It affects any descriptivism which allows that φ and ¬φ (or φ and ¬φ) are truth-conditionally compatible. (For as long as they are compatible, and as long as the truth-conditions are not implausibly complicated, their conjunction will describe a coherent and entertainable circumstance.) In other words, the problem affects any remotely plausible version of descriptivism.
There you have the elementary facts about the semantic behavior of epistemic modal operators that are difficult to handle under descriptivist assumptions. To this I want to add some further worries, these concerning the behavior of unembedded epistemic modal claims, rather than embedded epistemic modal clauses. These further worries occupy the next two sections.
Assertability and disagreement
We sometimes disagree, not merely about what is the case, but also about what might be the case, and about what is probably the case. The second concern about descriptivism is that it is hard to see how to deliver factualist truth-conditions for epistemic modal talk which make sense of this kind of disagreement.
The trouble was first noted by Huw Price. Price considers the idea of assigning φ factualist truth-conditions along the lines of 'Given the existing evidence, it is probable that φ'. He observes that the phrase 'the existing evidence' is ambiguous, admitting a spectrum of readings from the more subjective to the more objective. He first attempts a subjective reading of the phrase, along the lines of 'the evidence of which I [the speaker] am actually aware'. He objects that:
If I disagree with your claim that it is probably going to snow, I am not disagreeing that given your evidence it is likely that this is so... Indeed, I might agree that it is probably going to snow and yet think it false that this follows from your evidence. [Price, 1983, p. 404] Here the problem is that the proposed truth-conditions for 'It is probably going to snow' are too weak to make sense of appropriate disagreement.
Next he tries an objective reading of 'the existing evidence', along the lines of 'the evidence accessible in principle'. Such a reading would make disagreement intelligible: in the above example, for instance, you and Price would be differing over what is made probable by the evidence accessible in principle. But he objects that this more objective reading wouldn't square with the facts about when φ is felicitous to assert:
...consider the surgeon who says, 'Your operation has probably been successful. We could find out for sure, but since the tests are painful and expensive, it is best to avoid them.' The accessibility, in principle, of evidence which would override that on which the [probability] judgment is based, is here explicitly acknowledged. [Price, 1983, p. 405] Here the surgeon says φ, but leaves open whether φ is probable given the evidence accessible in principle. No surprise he would leave that question open, after all. He simply doesn't have the evidence accessible in principle. Hence his statement of φ is not well understood as speaking to a question about the evidence accessible in principle.
This now provokes the question: what or whose evidence is relevant to settling the truth of a given claim of φ? We appear to need something in between the evidence of the speaker and the evidence available in principle. It is hard to see, however, how something in between could ever really be assertable for the speaker. Something in between, after all, is by definition beyond the scope of the speaker's evidence. If we settled on something in between, our speaker would still be pictured as saying something whose truth turns on a body of evidence that she doesn't have. She would be pictured as speaking, and knowingly speaking, from a position of ignorance, making a stronger claim than is warranted by her evidence alone. Her speech act looks in danger of being irrational. The objection to descriptivism, then, is that it faces a tension. Either descriptivist truth-conditions systematically fail to capture the truth-value judgments that people actually make (by being too weak to capture the disagreement facts), or it captures these judgments but turns users of epistemic modal sentences into irrational asserters (by picturing them as making claims about/from a body of evidence they don't have). The difficulty here recurs exactly with epistemic possibility claims, as the reader may confirm by replacing 'probably' with 'possibly' in Price's examples.
Conflicting intuitions
The third problem with descriptivism is that it leads us to expect clear intuitions in cases where intuitions are not clear.
Consider the following case.
Fat Tony secretly plants highly compelling evidence of his murder at the docks. The evidence is discovered by the authorities, and word gets out about his apparent death. The next evening, from his safehouse, Fat Tony watches a panel of experts on the news discussing the situation.
Expert A has had a good look at the evidence found at the scene. "Fat Tony is dead," he says.
Expert B has also had a good look at the evidence, but his assessment is more cautious. "Fat Tony might be dead," B says.
We can all agree that Expert A, however reasonable his speech act was in light of the information available to him, spoke falsely. 4 Some are inclined to say that say B spoke truly; others are inclined to say that B spoke falsely; everyone else shrugs, or proposes to change the question to one with a clearer answer.
What needs explaining for eavesdropping cases such as this is not any univocal intuition we all have about the epistemic modal claim made in the case. There is no single intuition there to explain. Rather, what needs explaining is the absence of agreement, by competent speakers of English, on what the right answer is. What needs explaining are the conflicting intuitions. My point for now is just that conflicting intuitions are not expected on descriptivist assumptions. If B's utterance is in the business of representing the world as being a certain way, as A's presumably is, then either the world is that way, or it isn't. Other things being equal, we'd expect intuition concerning the truth of B's utterance to be about as clear as it is with A's. Descriptivists have work to do, then, explaining why things are not equal.
A descriptivist might reply that this work is not really so hard. "Epistemic modals are, after all, highly context-sensitive on our view. Perhaps the lack of uniformity in judgments here is simply due to the fact that subjects considering this case resolve this context sensitivity in different ways." But this reply is not satisfactory. If the interpretation of epistemic modals is as context-sensitive as suggested, presumably there is at least one reading of the modal according to which what B says above is both (1) true and (2) assertable for B. (Perhaps a reading along the lines of 'The evidence in the reach of B leaves open the possibility that Fat Tony is dead.') Now, where multiple interpretations of a speaker's utterance are possible, subjects tend to gravitate towards true and assertable readings, for the simple reason that true and assertable readings tend to make most sense of what the speaker is doingthey tend to be easier to situate into a rational overall pattern of action. But this would lead us to expect a fairly robust judgment that what B says is true, the incorrect result.
It is striking, incidentally, that the body of evidence allegedly relevant to assessing the truth of an epistemic modal claim should be so obscure to speakers who actually use these sentences. If these sentences really do advert to some tacit body of evidence, as standard versions of factualism maintain, why are we competent speakers of the language not able to articulate what this body is? This opacity is puzzling. It is certainly not a feature of context-sensitive language in general. For instance, when we use quantifiers in ordinary discourse, typically a restriction on the quantifier is provided tacitly by context. But with sufficient description of context, speakers can typically say what the restriction is; and where context is insufficient, speakers can typically indicate what further information is need to settle the question. Similarly for pronominal anaphora, and for demonstratives. But not so, it seems, for epistemic modals. Appeals to the context-sensitivity of epistemic modals seem of questionable explanatory power here, then.
Let me summarize. We have accumulated three desiderata for a theory of the meaning of epistemic modals. Such a theory should:
i. Explain why epistemic contradictions are unembeddable.
ii. Explain the assertability and disagreement facts concerning epistemic modal claims in context.
iii. Explain the conflicting intuitions concerning epistemic modal claims in eavesdropping cases.
The first desiderata is plausibly understood as a constraint on the formal semantics of epistemic modals (together with the semantics of the relevant embedding environments). The second two desiderata are plausibly understood as constraining the pragmatics of epistemic modal claims-more precisely, their communicative content. The first of these pragmatic desiderata concerns the intra-contextual facts about how we assess epistemic modal claims qua participants in the discourse. The second concerns the extra-contextual facts about how we assess epistemic modal claims qua onlookers from outside the discourse. Descriptivism, we have seen, is not well-equipped to satisfy these desiderata. It is time to take steps towards an alternative.
States of mind
If we want to understand what is going on with epistemic modal talk, we may be better served by taking a less direct approach. Let us take a step back from the linguistic facts and from direct questions about the truth-conditions of epistemic modal clauses. Let us ask instead:
What is it to be in a state of mind which accepts what an epistemic modal claim says?
I will suggest that descriptivism rests on a mistaken answer to this question, and that getting the answer right is the first step towards clarifying the meaning and role of epistemic modal discourse. The focus of this section will be on developing a model for what it is to believe that something might be so, or that something is probably so. Once we are clear on this, we will turn to the semantics and pragmatics of the language that is used to express these states of mind. It will be some time before we turn back to the desiderata recently enumerated above; but when we finally do, we will be well-positioned to accommodate them.
Epistemic Possibility
Begin with epistemic possibility. I believe that it is possible that Bob is in his office; Frank believes that it might be raining in Topeka. What kind of states of mind are we each in? Doxastic states of mind, trivially. How to model a doxastic state of mind? For our purposes, we may represent a doxastic state by its informational content, abstracting for now from its functional role in cognition and action. How, then, to represent the informational content of a doxastic state of mind?
Start with a familiar picture of informational content in general. Information is foremost that which eliminates possibilities. To gain information is to transition to a state of mind which leaves fewer possibilities open as candidates for actuality. As a first approximation, then, we may represent a body informational content as a set of possibilities, those possibilities left open by that informational content. So a state of belief is representable by a set of possibilities: intuitively, those not excluded by what is believed.
5 We can think of this set as the set of possibilities at which each proposition believed by the agent is true. We may define proposition functionally, as whatever it is which is the potential object of belief. Of propositions we need only assume that they determine truth-conditions, again representable by a set of possibilities. (For convenience I will talk as if propositions just are sets of worlds, but strictly a determination relation is all that is needed.)
Equipped with this representation, we can provide an abstract picture of the descriptivist model of epistemic possibility beliefs-of what, according to the descriptivist, it is to believe that it is possible that Bob is in his office, or that it might be raining in Topeka. The picture is very simple. It looks like this:
The descriptivist model the proposition that φ A's belief worlds (Where 'B A φ' abbreviates 'A believes that it might be/is possible that φ'.) The rectangle is logical space, the space of maximally specific metaphysical possibilities. A subset of those possibilities is the proposition that φ, here the set of possibilities contained within the dashed ellipse. A believes that φ just when A's belief worlds are a subset of the proposition that φ. Thus for me to believe that Bob might be in his office is for a certain proposition-whatever proposition it is the descriptivist gives me-to be true throughout my belief worlds. Again, standardly the descriptivist's truth-conditions are propositions about some body of evidence, where this body of evidence includes the knowledge of the agent doing the believing. As a result, the typical descriptivist picture is one according to which states of φ-belief are second-order states of mind, states of belief about (perhaps inter alia) one's state of knowledge.
This way of thinking about the standard descriptivist picture provokes the question: when I believe Bob might be in his office, am I in a second-order state of mind?
We could try asking it like this. Is the question, "Why believe Bob might be in his office?" in part the question, "Why believe that I don't know that Bob isn't in his office?" Pretheoretically, the idea seems to have little motivation. Our initial question seems to be about Bob's location, not about my views about Bob's location. The question "Why believe Bob might be in his office?" seems instead equivalent to the question, "Why fail to believe that Bob isn't in his office?" This latter question is clearly not a question about what to believe about one's knowledge. It is just a question concerning what to believe about where Bob is.
These points are, I think, suggestive, but alone they are perhaps not decisive.
6 Let us then consider the issue from another, rather different perspective. Suppose we are eating dinner, and my dog Fido comes into the room and heels by my chair. Occasionally I toss Fido a bone at dinner, but usually I don't. You ask why Fido is sitting there staring at me. I say:
(11) Fido thinks I might give him a bone.
An appropriate remark. What does it mean? Does it in part mean, as standard versions of descriptivism would require, that Fido believes that it is compatible with what he knows that I will give him a bone? That is not plausible. Surely the truth of (11) doesn't turn on recherche facts about canine self-awareness. Surely (11) may be true even if Fido is incapable of such second-order states of mind.
These considerations suggest that the question of whether φ is 'transparent', as it were, to the question of whether φ. I think this is reflected in the kinds of reasons we understand to support epistemic possibility beliefs. Naively, correctly believing that φ is a matter of there being an absence of conclusive reason to believe that ¬φ. Correctly believing that φ is a matter of there being conclusive reason to believe that φ. Both kinds of reason concern how to settle one's doxastic state toward the proposition that φ. Believing that φ and believing that φ are states of mind are supported by reasons of the same category.
It seems, then, that we have found another desideratum for a theory of epistemic modals. Such a theory should iv. Avoid the assumption that belief reports embedding epistemic modal clauses report second-order states of mind (i.e., beliefs inter alia about one's state of mind).
Again, this is another desideratum that descriptivism is not well placed to capture. If one expresses a proposition one believes when one says (e.g.) 'It might be raining', and that proposition has the epistemic-state-describing truthconditions assigned to it by standard versions of descriptivism, it a very short step to the thought that to believe it might be raining is to believe that very proposition. (Let me emphasize that this point is no artifact of the possible worlds model I have used to illustrate descriptivism; it depends on no particular features of that model.)
6 From a first-person point of view, it can be difficult to disentangle questions about what the world is like from the question of what one believes the world is like. As Evans famously observed, "If someone asks me 'Do you believe that there will be a third world war?', I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question 'Will there be a third world war?'" [Evans, 1983, p. 225] . (But the point should not be overstated. The questions, "Why believe that φ?" and "Why believe that you believe that φ?" needn't always have the same answer.) Let us ask now: what minimal modification to the descriptivist model would be required to satisfy this new desideratum (iv)? I suggest that the modification is this one: On this revised model, due essentially to Frank Veltman 7 , there is no proposition that φ at work. The question of whether A believes that φ is just the question whether A's belief worlds leave open possibilities wherein the proposition that φ is true. To believe Bob might be in his office is simply to be in a doxastic state which fails to rule out the possibility that Bob is in his office. It is a first-order state of mind.
Veltman's model is a considerable advance over the descriptivist model. It avoids the implausible idea that epistemic possibility beliefs are second-order states of mind, and in a way that lets us see why reasons that support belief that φ are ipso facto reasons that support belief that φ. A tempting thing to do now would be to craft a semantics and pragmatics for epistemic modals around Veltman's model, and see whether it does better than descriptivism on our earlier desiderata (i)-(iii) above.
I will not do that now, however. (Of course, it has already been done by Veltman himself.) Although Veltman's model is surely on the right track, there is, I think, still room to improve on it in an important way. We have one more desideratum to uncover. Once we uncover it and upgrade Veltman's model accordingly, we can then raise the question of what semantics and pragmatics is suited to the (upgraded) model.
I turn then to a problem for Veltman's model. 8 Recall Frank, who believes it might be raining in Topeka. Why does he believe this? We could imagine 7 See Veltman [1986, 1996] and (building on Veltman) Beaver [2001] , where this model is tacit in the semantics developed in these works. various accounts of how it happened. For instance: He left Topeka this morning and it looked cloudy then. Or the weatherman just now said the chance of rain was 30%. Alternatively, perhaps his evidential situation is more impoverished. Perhaps he has no noteworthy reasons in favor of believing that it's raining in Topeka; rather he merely notices his lack of sufficient reason to believe it isn't raining in Topeka. Perhaps on the way out the door, en route to Topeka, he glances by chance at his umbrella, and the question of rain in Topeka then occurs to him. He realizes he doesn't know whether to expect rain in Topeka. He then comes to think that it might be raining in Topeka.
This last kind of case raises a basic question. What is the difference between Frank's state of mind before the question of rain in Topeka occurs to him and his state of mind after? The question is a troubling one for Veltman's model. We know, on the model, that Frank's posterior state of belief must be one compatible with the proposition that its raining in Topeka. But what, we ask, was his prior state of mind? The same: he had no prior beliefs one way or the other as concerns rain in Topeka, so what he believed was compatible with either circumstance. So he has transitioned from it's being compatible with his doxastic state that it's raining in Topeka to... it's being compatible with his doxastic state that it's raining in Topeka. This is wrong: clearly some aspect of Frank's state of mind has changed, and our model ought to capture this change.
We could just as well make the point synchronically, by considering two states of mind at a single time rather than one across time. Compare Frank (in his posterior state) to Rem, a man living across the globe in Rotterdam. Rem has heard of Topeka, and he even knows roughly where it is on the map. But Topeka has no place in his life, and thoughts of Topeka simply have not crossed his mind all year. Like myriad other questions, the question of rain in Topeka today has just not occurred to Rem. Does Rem believe it might be raining in Topeka? It would be bizarre to answer affirmatively. It is true, we may stipulate, that for all Rem believes, it is raining in Topeka. For nothing he believes rules that possibility out. But this is merely to point out that 'Rem believes it might be raining in Topeka' and 'For all Rem believes, it is raining in Topeka' do not have the same truth-conditions. The states of mind of Frank and of Rem, we can say, are alike in as much as for all they each believe, it is raining in Topeka. But they differ in that Frank believes it might be raining in Topeka, whereas that is not so for Rem.
This gives us our last desideratum.
(v.) Capture the difference between a proposition's merely being compatible with a state of mind and its being considered possible by that state of mind (or its being marked as an open possibility according to that state of mind).
To satisfy this desideratum, Veltman's model needs to be enriched. I propose to enrich it as follows. Frank has considered the question of their being rain in Topeka. His is a state of mind that has taken note of a distinction: the distinction between there being rain in Topeka and there not being rain in in Topeka. Rem, in contrast, has not considered the question of rain in Topeka. His is a state of mind that has not taken note of that distinction. The respective states of mind of Frank and Rem differ, then, in the distinctions they have taken note of. What we therefore need is a representation of doxastic states of mind which tracks the distinctions that the agent being modeled takes note of.
A distinction-e.g., the distinction between rain and no rain in Topekamay be represented by a line through logical space, one carving it into two regions, the rainy and the rain-free. Suppose we collect all of the distinctions an agent takes note of, or counts as having taken note of, relative to some broad project of inquiry. That supplies us with an array of lines through logical space. Drawing them all at once, we then have a partition Π of logical space, a division of logical space into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive regions. We can then try saying this: the distinctions that an agent takes note of are the ones that 'carve according to the lines' of Π. The distinctions that an agent fails to take are those whose lines depart from the lines of Π. Pursuing this visual metaphor, call such a partition a modal resolution. It represents the agent's 'modal acuity' as pertains to the project of inquiry in question, capturing only the level of specificity the agent may be said to be aware of in a broad sense. My plan is to index states of mind to a modal resolution. Some propositions will be visible to an agent in a state with resolution Π, namely, those whose boundaries respect the partition over logical space imposed by Π. All other propositions go unseen by the agent.
A picture may help. Here we see that p respects the grid imposed over logical space by our resolution Π. Hence it is visible with respect to Π. Not so for q, which cuts through the grid. Say a proposition p is Π-visible just in case each cell of Π either implies (is a subset of) p or contradicts (is disjoint from) p.
States of belief, I propose, are resolution-sensitive. Relative to a resolution, a doxastic state will select a set of cells at that resolution as candidates for actuality (in the sense that a cell is the actual cell just in case it contains the actual world). Formally, a doxastic state is now a (partial) function taking a resolution to a subpartition of that resolution. The cells of the subpartition may be thought of as the doxastically open possibilities for the agent at that resolution. We can call this partition the agent's belief partition.
To get a grip on this picture, it is helpful to think of a resolution as associated with, or even equivalent to, a question, in the following sense: the cells of the resolution give all the alternative complete answers to the question; the question asks which cell is the 'true' one, the one containing the actual world.
9 On this way of approaching the model, the idea is that a doxastic state can be understood as a function from questions to answers. (The answers will usually only be partial, eliminating some but not all alternatives. And the question reflected by a resolution needn't be one particular easy to express in language: better to understand it as a capturing a family of topically related questions on which the doxastic state takes a stance on-as capturing a relatively detailed project of inquiry.) I said that a doxastic state is representable by a partial function on resolutions. Let me say how partial. Suppose we select, from the space of possible resolutions of logical space, the family of resolutions that have been active in the psychological life of the agent we are modeling, in the sense that these resolutions mark the various propositional distinctions (or questions, or subject matters) the agent can be said to have taken note of. These will reflect what we could call the agent's 'considered questions'-for short, her inquiries. Her doxastic state is a function defined on these inquiries. Elsewhere her doxastic state is undefined.
In saying her doxastic state is elsewhere undefined, let me be clear that the idea is not that human agents are incapable of considering more questions that they actually ever do consider. We are, of course, capable in principle of considering countless questions. The idea instead is that when an agent considers a fresh question, she makes up her mind on it, and her doxastic state then becomes defined on a resolution which represents that question. What is 'making up one's mind' ? It is natural to think that when an agent comes to a new question, what she attempts to do is to 'increase' the resolution of one of her existing inquiries, so as to make that resolution reveal the possible answers to the new question. Thereby she see what her positions on her other inquiries commit her to with respect to the new question. As rational agents we try, insofar as we can, to integrate all of our inquiries, so that information is pooled 9 A well-known theory of the semantics of interrogatives identifies their semantic values with partitions of logical space. See Groenendijk and Stokhof [1997] and references cited therein. Hamblin [1958] is the pioneering work. Other sources of inspiration for the resolution-sensitive model I am proposing include Lewis [1988] , who models subject matters as partitions of logical space, and Schaffer [2004 Schaffer [ , 2005 who attempts to understand states of knowledge as relativized to questions. (Schaffer's formal development of this relativization differs from mine.) and so that answers are consistent.
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The resolution-sensitive model of belief has various applications, full discussion of which is better reserved for elsewhere.
11 Let me now turn to the solution this model presents to our problem for Veltman's model. Recall the challenge was to say what about Frank's doxastic state could have changed when he transitioned into believing that it might be raining in Topeka; or equivalently, to say what the difference was between Frank (after this transition) and Rem, whose mind is free of weather-in-Topeka thoughts. With a resolution-sensitive model, the thing to say is that Frank's doxastic state came to be defined on a resolution making the proposition that it's raining in Topeka (a) visible, and (b) compatible with his belief partition at that resolution.
12 This is the difference between him and Rem, who has not considered the question of rain in Topeka, and who (hence) has no inquiry making the relevant proposition visible. So the new model of what it is for an agent to believe it might be that φ is this:
10 We try, but it's hard. There are only so many distinctions we can see at once, only so many we can bring together in a single state of mind. As a result there are severe limits on the extent to which we can unify our disparate inquiries into a single inquiry. And as a result it may be that we fail to believe the consequences of two propositions we believe. This can happen when the propositions are believed with respect to differing resolutions, resolutions not yet integrated. The issue of deductive omniscience in a resolution-sensitive setting is discussed in more detail in Yalcin [2007b] , where connections with awareness logics are also explored.
11 See Yalcin [2007b] . Let me note one further application, which may give the formalism more intuitive content. A resolution-sensitive model provides a way of articulating the relation between belief and what we could call depth of understanding. Consider Dennett's old example of the child of six who tells us his daddy is a doctor. Should we say that the child understands what he says?
Must the child be able to produce paraphrases, or expand on the subject by saying that his father cures sick people? Or is it enough if the child knows that Daddy's being a doctor precludes his being a butcher, a baker, a candlestick maker? Does the child know what a doctor is if he lacks the concept of a fake doctor, a quack, an unlicensed practitioner? Surely the child's understanding of what it is to be a doctor (as well as what it is to be a father, etc.) will grow through the years, and hence his understanding of the sentence 'Daddy is a doctor' will grow. [Dennett, 1969, p. 183] Surely Dennett is right that the child's understanding will grow. Dennett took his example to present a problem for the very idea of "things known, for facts or propositions, or whatever." But we needn't abandon the idea that what the child knows or believes is a proposition. Instead we can take the example to further motivate the idea that knowing and believing are states indexed to a modal resolution. The child, we can say, believes roughly the same proposition we do. The difference is that he believes this proposition with respect to a relatively coarse resolution, one making few distinctions. His understanding is, as we might put it, low res. As a result he distinguishes only a relatively small number of possible ways his belief can be true or false. His understanding deepens as this resolution is further refined.
12 More precisely, compatible with the set of possibilities partitioned by his belief partition. One can think of it as a sort of 'pixelated', low-res version of Veltman's model.
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Above I alleged that 'A believes it might be that φ' and 'For all A believes, φ' do not have the same truth-conditions. The difference can be reflected in a resolution-sensitive model. Π This is a situation in which it would be true to say that for all A believes, φ, but false to say that A believes it might be that φ. The former is true for A with respect to the given resolution just in case there are φ-worlds within the union of A's belief partition. This is just the classic possible worlds treatment of compatibility with belief. There are many more propositions compatible with what one believes than there are propositions one believes might be true.
I have gone on about what it is to believe something might be the case, and about what it is for something to be true for all one believes. But what about ordinary, vanilla belief in propositions-belief whose ascription does not involve epistemic modals? How is this represented in a resolution-sensitive model?
Here it should be clear that model enables a distinction between the propositions which are the tacit commitments of the belief state at a resolution and those propositions which are explicit to the agent. Some propositions are explicitly believed: they mark distinctions the agent can be said to have recognized or taken note of. Formally, these are the propositions constructible entirely via unions of the cells of the resolution at which the doxastic state is being assessed. The resolution makes these propositions visible, and the proposition is true throughout the agent's belief partition. Tacit commitments are like explicit beliefs in that they are also true throughout one's belief partition, but they differ from them in that they are invisible at the resolution with respect to which the doxastic state is being evaluated.
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We can depict the difference between explicit belief and tacit commitment as follows. Here we see that while explicit beliefs and tacit commitments are both propositions true throughout the agent's belief partition, explicit beliefs carve according to the resolution and tacit commitments do not.
15 It is plausible that belief reports in natural language tend, as a default, to presuppose that the relevant proposition is believed explicitly. (This, at any rate, would explain Fodor's intuition (in Fodor [1985] ) that you don't quite count as believing that no grass 14 See also Swanson [2006] for a formally similar idea, though developed in a Bayesian setting. 15 As should be clear, explicit belief and tacit commitment are resolution-sensitive notions. A resolution-insensitive notion of tacit commitment might also be defined in the model: say that a proposition is a global tacit commitment of an agent just in case the proposition is a tacit commitment with respect to all the agent's inquiries. grows on kangaroos unless you have actually considered the question.)
Our resolution-sensitive upgrade to Veltman's model provides the resources to satisfy desiderata (iv)-(v). My plan is to craft a semantics and pragmatics for epistemic possibility and necessity talk around this model. The plan will be carried out in the next two sections (Sects. 7-8), where we will see that the semantics and pragmatics that results satisfies desiderata (i)-(iii).
Before that, however, we will want to perform just one more important upgrade to the model. The upgrade is needed to handle probabilistic information and the associated probability talk.
Epistemic Probability
I said I would model a doxastic state as a partial function taking a resolution to a subpartition of that resolution, where the cells of the subpartition may be thought of as the doxastically open possibilities for the agent at that resolution. The cells are as specific as the possibilities get, as far at the agent's state of mind at that resolution is concerned.
Now it is time to recognize that these possibilities needn't all have the same status according to the agent. The agent may regard some of these open possibilities as more likely than others. More generally, she may regard it is as more likely that actuality is contained within one region of her belief partition rather than another region. This is something we will need reflected in the model, if we want to capture what it is to believe something probable. A priori, there are a number of ways it might be done. 16 The approach I will take is to define a simple probability measure over the propositions visible to the agent at a resolution. A doxastic state will now be a partial function from resolutions to pairs of a belief partition and a probability measure over (the propositions visible at) that resolution. We can call such a pair a doxastic space. Given resolution Π and the corresponding belief partition Π it determines, the measure is to be defined so that: (i) P r assigns each cell ι in π a real value in the closed interval from zero to one, such that these values all sum to one.
(ii) For all propositions p that are visible in Π, P r(p) = def ι⊆p P r(ι); otherwise P r(p) is undefined.
The probabilistic upgrade of the resolution-sensitive model is easy to visualize. It merely adds a quantitative, linear range of distinctions within the belief partition. We can represent this informally by the darkness of the shading of each cell in the partition, with the darker shades corresponding to greater probability. The probability of any visible proposition according to A's doxastic space is the just the sum of the probabilities of the cells in π where the proposition is true. Thus the probability of the proposition that φ above is given by the sum of the probabilities of the eleven φ-cells within π.
This model provides an easy way to say what, in abstract, it is for Frank to believe that it is probably raining in Topeka. He believes this, relative to some resolution Π on which his doxastic state is defined, just in case (a) the proposition that it's raining in Topeka is Π-visible, and (b) this proposition receives a probability greater than its negation, i.e., greater than 1 2 , at the corresponding doxastic space.
18 (Letting A be Frank and φ be the proposition that it's raining in Topeka, the above diagram would be a fair representation of a situation in which Frank believes its probably raining in Topeka, since it is clear that most of the probability mass is within the proposition that φ.) The model also provides for Frank's beliefs concerning the comparative probability of propositions: he believes rain is more likely that snow in Topeka (say) just in case his doxastic space assigns more probability to the former than to the latter proposition, with respect to the given resolution. Note that there is no proposition that φ in this picture.
At one level of abstraction, this is the sort of model of what it is to believe something probable that Bayesians tacitly have in mind (modulo the resolutionsensitivity). To believe a proposition probable is just to be in a certain doxastic state of mind modelable by a probability space, where the measure of that space assigns the proposition a relevantly high value. On both the current picture and the usual Bayesian picture, believing propositions probable is not assumed to be a second-order state of mind-it is not a belief about one's credence, say. And neither is it a state consisting in (full) belief in some proposition about one's evidence, as the descriptivist proposals for φ discussed above would most naturally recommend.
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This upgrade to the resolution-sensitive model extends its coverage to probabilistically articulated belief states, and it does so without compromising desideratum (iv).
Earlier I said that information is that which eliminates possibilities. The probabilistic enrichment of doxastic states that I am recommending allows us to generalize this notion of informational content. Let us take it that information can do more than just eliminate possibilities. It may also shift the probabilities over the possibilities, without eliminating any possibilities altogether. Informational content itself, we can say, is probabilistically articulated. The informational content of a state of belief is the doxastic space of the state of mind at the resolution in question. We could call this view about informational content content probabilism. I want to endorse content probabilism for the whole family of what we could call acceptance attitudes: not only believing, which has been the focus of this section, but also states of presupposing, presuming, supposing, postulating, conjecturing, and knowing. Let us suppose that all of these states may have a probabilistically articulated informational content: all of them may be represented by diagram just like Figure 7 . Doxastic spaces are just specific examples of what we could call information spaces.
Content probabilism differs from traditional subjective Bayesianism in that the probabilities of the model reflect, not the strength of one's attitude towards content, but rather the content of the attitude itself. My aim in adopting this enriched conception of the informational content is, of course, to use it in an account of the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic modal talk. To this we now turn.
Expressing states of mind
The aim of the last section was to develop a picture of what it is to be in a state of mind that accepts what an epistemic possibility or probability claim says. It remains to say precisely how epistemic modal talk serves to express these states of mind. This is the question, both of the compositional semantics of epistemic modal clauses, and also of their pragmatic effect on the communicative contexts in which they are uttered unembedded. In outline, the plan here is straightforward. We have explained already what abstract property a doxastic state, or more generally a state of information, must have in order to count as accepting that φ. Now I will say that the compositional semantic value of an epistemic possibility clause, relative to context, just is that property. Pragmatically, I will say that one who makes an unembedded possibility claim is standardly understood as attempting to engender coordination on this feature of her state of mind-to get others to enter into that state. The same basic story will be told, mutatis mutandis, for φ. And, treating φ as the semantic dual of φ, we will automatically get a story about epistemic necessity. Now to spell it out. First I state semantics for epistemic modals and for the relevant embedding environments. Then I situate the semantics in a broader pragmatics of communication. Once the semantic and pragmatic apparatus is in place, we will show that it satisfies desiderata (i)-(iii).
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Semantics
Start with a two-dimensional intensional semantics in the style of Kaplan [1989] , built around a recursive definition of truth at a point of evaluation. ('Truth at a point of evaluation' is a technical notion, at best indirectly related to any folk notion of truth.) The points of evaluation relative to which extensions are defined have two coordinates: a context coordinate and an index coordinate. Contexts are locations where speech acts take place. Following Lewis [1980] , we may think of them as centered worlds, determining both a possible world and a spatiotemporal location within that world. Contexts have indefinitely many features-speakers, audiences, indicated objects, standing presuppositions, etc.-and these features may figure into the truth of sentences said in that context in indefinitely many ways. Indices are n-tuples of specific features of context, those features which are independently shiftable by operators in the language. Which features of the context are shiftable depends on what operators the language contains. We take it our indices include at least a world parameter, since the fragment of English we consider has operators which shift the world at which an embedded clause is evaluated. Now in addition to context and index parameters, let our points of evaluation include also an information parameter, i, ranging over resolution-indexed information spaces. Formally we can take these to be triples of the form Π, π, P r where Π is a resolution, π ⊆ Π, and P r is defined over Π-visible propositions as above.
Although denotations are now technically all relativized to a value for the information parameter, in most cases extensions will not be sensitive to it. Predicates will be assigned extensions relative only to worlds, as usual; logical connectives will be defined as usual; and nothing new need be assumed about the semantics of names, generalized quantifiers, etc. Most clauses will continue to place conditions only on the world coordinate of the index relative to context, and will therefore retain their ordinary possible worlds truth-conditions. In such cases the information parameter i will be idle. We exploit i mainly in the definition of truth for epistemic modal talk and for certain related environments.
The semantics for epistemic possibility and necessity has two components. First, here is the definition of truth at a point of evaluation: 21 φ c,i,w is true iff ∃w ∈ π i : φ c,i,w is true φ c,i,w is true iff ∀w ∈ π i : φ c,i,w is true Given the partition π supplied by i, these modals just invoke quantification over the set of worlds π partitions. Second, we add that these clauses carry a visibility presupposition, to the effect that the resolution Π supplied by i makes the embedded proposition that φ visible.
22 The visibility presupposition is where the resolution-sensitivity comes in. It makes the quantification over worlds invoked by epistemic modals equivalent, in effect, to quantification over partitions cells-the coarser possibilities entertainable by mere mortals.
23 The general idea is that, relative to context, epistemic possibility and necessity clauses divide the space of information spaces, not the space of possible worlds. Informally, an epistemic possibility clause is true with respect to an information space just in case the partition of the space includes a φ-possibility (that is, a φ-cell, a cell for which φ is true throughout). Epistemic necessity clauses get the matching dual semantics: they are true just in case every cell in the partition of the space is a φ-possibility.
φ-clauses have a semantics which turns, as you might expect, on the probability measure of the information space it is evaluated with respect to. Here is the semantics:
Again the idea is that, relative to context, epistemic probability clauses divide the space of information spaces. φ is true at an information space just in case the measure of the space assigns the proposition that φ better-than-even odds. We can think of these semantic values as picking out the relevant properties of states of mind we identified in the last section. (Indeed, that is exactly what they are crafted to do.) If you find the above truth-conditions for epistemic possibility clauses opaque, just look at the Figure 4 above (p. 19): φ is true at a point of evaluation c, i, w just in case the information space of i stands to the proposition that φ as in Figure 4 . Likewise, φ is true at a point of evaluation c, i, w just in case the information space of i stands to the proposition that φ as in Figure 7 . Now that we are doing semantics, we can be more precise about what we mean by 'factualist truth-conditions'. Factualist truth-conditions are truthconditions which are a function of the world coordinate of the points of evaluation in question. In this sense, the truth-conditions for epistemic modal clauses just provided are nonfactualist: they do not place conditions on the world coordinate of the points at which they are evaluated.
What does this technical property of the semantics ultimately amount to? That depends on how the semantics is integrated into a larger picture of the linguistic transfer of information. Let us turn now to situating this semantics with respect to pragmatics.
Pragmatics
Suppose it's right that to be semantically competent with epistemic modal language is to know, at some relatively abstract level, that the meanings of epistemic modal clauses serve to divide the points of evaluation as I have described. How is the knowledge exploited in communication? We could put the question like this: what effect do unembedded epistemic modal claims have when there are expressed in a discourse context? Proposal: when one says that it might be raining, or that it's probably raining, or that it must be raining, one expresses one's (probabilistic, resolutionsensitive) state of mind. One does so by saying something whose compositional semantic value, relative to context, just is that feature of one's state of mind that one is aiming to express. Abstractly, to express such an aspect of one's state of mind is to attempt to get one's interlocutors to enter into that state of mind. Less abstractly, to make an epistemic modal claim is to propose to one's interlocutors that their states of presupposition change so as to come satisfy the property the epistemic modal claim expresses as a matter of its semantics. One proposes to coordinate the presuppositional states of the interlocutors with respect to that property.
We can say what this means in detail by performing a probabilistic, resolutionsensitive upgrade of certain popular account of how assertions in general change the informational context of a discourse.
24 Begin by thinking of linguistic communication as foremost a matter of coordination on a body of information. Participants in conversation start with certain information presumed to be in common or mutually taken for granted, and the speech acts they perform in context are directed, and mutually understood to be directed, at variously influencing that body of information. The attitude that communicating agents take towards the body of information they share is the attitude state I am calling presupposition. Presupposition is, in the intended sense, a public attitude: one is to presuppose only the information that one's interlocutors do. Now states of presupposition, we allow, are resolution-sensitive. The set of possibilities left open by your state of presupposition is representable by the cells of a partition of possible worlds. When someone utters a sentence with factualist truth-conditions relative to context-that is, when someone asserts a proposition-and everyone understands what is said, the proposition becomes visible in the context, in the sense that the resolutions of the interlocutors' presuppositional states make the proposition visible. The speech act of asserting that proposition is understood as a proposal to presuppose it. To presuppose it is just to eliminate those worlds (cells) incompatible with it from one's presupposition partition.
Turning to epistemic modal claims, I want to say essentially the same thing: to say that φ (or φ, or φ) is to propose to the participants of the conversation that they come to presuppose that φ (or φ, or φ). The difference with factualist assertions lies only in what it is to presuppose these things. The semantics of these sentences makes their truth-conditions nonfactualist relative to context. One therefore cannot eliminate possible worlds from one's presupposition partition according to whether they 'satisfy' these truth-conditions, since these clauses don't determine a condition on worlds in the first place. Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear what it is to presuppose φ: it is for the proposition that φ to be visible at one's state of presupposition, and for the informational content of one's state to be compatible with that proposition, as in Fig. 4 above. (Similarly for φ: to presuppose this is for the proposition that φ to be visible for one's state, and for the informational content of one's state to entail that proposition.) This sentence in context semantically characterizes a property of a state of mind, and the speech act move of saying this sentence is understood to be a proposal, to one's interlocutors, that they make their presuppositional states satisfy this property.
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The extension to probability talk is straightforward. We allow that states of presupposition may be, not only resolution-sensitive, but also probabilistically articulated. Then, just as with epistemic possibility and necessity sentences, φ uttered in context is understood to be a proposal to enter into a presuppositional state satisfying the property of states of mind the sentence expresses as a matter of its semantics.
That is the basic pragmatic tale I want to tell. It requires clarification on two points.
The first concerns the place of resolution in context. I said that it is in the nature of presupposition that "one is to presuppose only the information that one's interlocutor do". What does this mean? At minimum it means that each of the discourse participant's states of presupposition should have the same tacit commitments. But what about the resolutions of the discourse participants? Need these all be the same, in order for everyone to be presupposing correctly?
No, we do not need to assume this. One does not violate the presuppositions a discourse by recognizing more distinctions, among the possibilities compatible with what is presupposed, than one's interlocutors do. But while we needn't coordinate on all of the possible alternatives we might individually recognize, we surely do need to coordinate on some of them in order to communicate. To transfer information, we need to be able to jointly attend to ways of carving up logical space, so that we may coordinate on the region of logical space we want to consider or want to take ourselves to be in. It is plausible, therefore, that the resolution of any individual agent in a discourse must be a refinement of a single, relatively coarse modal resolution-where this single, relatively coarse resolution represents the set of distinctions that are mutually recognized by all 25 A natural conjecture is that often the point in uttering epistemically modalized sentences is to get listeners to adjust their resolutions-hence the possibilities they take note of-by getting them to accommodate, in the sense of Lewis [1979] , the visibility presuppositions of these sentences. Sometimes you just want to get your interlocutor to take note of the as-yet uneliminated possibility that φ. Saying φ is a way to accomplish this via accommodation. Alternatively, sometimes you want to call attention to an as-yet unseen consequence (a tacit commitment) of what is being presupposed. Saying φ is a way to accomplish this, again via accommodation.
parties to the conversation.
26 (A resolution Π is a refinement of resolution Π just in case every cell in in Π is a union of cells in Π , and some cell in Π is not a union of cells in Π.) Let us call the resolution corresponding to this body of distinctions the context resolution. Think of it as a minimal resolution for the context, one each agent's state of presupposition should respect.
The second issue concerns the connection between the presuppositions of a discourse and the broader purposes of the interlocutors. My pragmatic story may feel somewhat insulated from reality. Factualist and non-factualist claims alike, I said, serve as proposals to change the presuppositions of the discourse. But what is the point of this game of updating presuppositions? How does it connect with the broader aims of the conversing agents?
Given only the information presupposed among a group of agents-representable, on my story, as an information space indexed to the context resolutionone does not yet know how the agents of the context mutually regard what is presupposed with respect to their other cognitive attitudes. It is not yet to be given that the agents also regard those presuppositions as knowledge, or as warranted belief, or conjecture, or fiction, or whatever. If we want, we can define a second notion which will let us articulate the status that the agents of a given context attach to the information presupposed. Call this notion the conversational tone:
An attitude is the conversational tone of a group of interlocutors just in case it is common knowledge in the group that everyone is to strike this attitude towards what is presupposed.
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When interlocutors coordinate on a conversational tone, they come into agreement about what counts as the correct non-public attitude to take towards what is common ground. This will be a reflection, inter alia, of the purpose of the discourse. If the conversational tone of our discourse is knowledge, then we regard the information presupposed as common knowledge, and we take our discourse to be trafficking, and aiming to traffic, in factual information. If the conversational tone is pretense, then we are not attempting to keep the information presupposed compatible with the truth, and we take ourselves to be trafficking in fiction. And so on, for all the various attitudes around and in between.
So what, ultimately, does it mean to propose to revise the standing presuppositions of a discourse-as I have claimed we do with declarative sentences of language (factualist and nonfactualist alike)? What it comes to, as far as the broader projects of the interlocutors are concerned, depends entirely on the conversational tone. Thus, for example, if the conversational tone is belief and I say that it might be raining, I am understood as expressing the compatibility of my doxastic state with rain, and recommending that feature of my doxastic state to you. Alternatively, if we are jointly reasoning under a counterfactual supposition and I say that it might be raining, I am understood as expressing the compatibility of my suppositional state with rain, and as recommending that feature of my suppositional state to you.The notion of conversational tone helps us to separate issues about the narrow pragmatic dynamics of presupposition change from issues about the broader role presupposition might take in any given discourse.
Problems solved
We have come a long way from the descriptivist picture. Our initial motivation for departing from that picture came from its failure to satisfy the desiderata (i)-(iii) above. In the process of approaching the issues from the point of view of the states of mind epistemic modal claims express, we motivated two further desiderata ((iv)-(v)) and developed an abstract model satisfying them. It is time to show that this model of epistemic modal thought and talk gets the right results for the three problems levied against the descriptivist picture at the outset.
Desideratum 1: explaining epistemic contradictions
We observed above the unembeddability of epistemic contradictions such as:
We were at a loss to explain this unembeddability along descriptivist lines. But given the apparatus in place, it is straightforward what to say. The defect in sentences embedding epistemic contradictions is parasitic on the fact that there is no state of mind that could be characterized as accepting an epistemic contradiction. On the model of the informational content of states of mind put forth in the last section, to accept the first conjunct of (1)-whether tacitly or explicitly-is for the proposition that it's raining to be true throughout one's information space. But to accept the second conjunct is for the negation of that proposition to be compatible with one's information space. Obviously, there is no one state of mind satisfying both of these properties. Similarly for (2), whose second conjunct not only requires the proposition that it isn't raining be compatible with one's information space, but requires also that the proposition receive greater than .5 probability from the measure associated with the space.
Of course, it would be nice to have a formal semantics for attitude verbs that would vindicate this abstract explanation, in the sense of allowing us to prove mechanically that attitude verbs embedding epistemic contradictions describe incoherent states of mind. Here is the generic form of such a semantics:
Where 'A' is a schematic letter over acceptance attitude verbs and 'A' is a schematic letter ranging over the resolution-indexed information spaces such verbs serve to express. 28 On this semantics, acceptance attitude verbs do two things. First, they invoke universal quantification over the coarse possibilities provided by the partition π of the information space of the associated attitude state (relative to a given resolution; in typical cases the 'given resolution', we can take it, will be the context resolution). Second, they shift the value of the information parameter to the information space of the attitude state. Again, if we have the intuition that attitude ascriptions are typically ascriptions of attitudes explicitly held, we should want to add that attitude ascriptions carry a visibility presupposition with respect to the propositions which occur within the scope of their complements. (The presupposition is that these propositions are visible with respect to the resolution to which the state ascribed is indexed.)
Equipped with this semantics, it is trivial to prove that constructions like these (repeated):
(4) # Suppose it's raining and it might not be raining.
(5) # Suppose it's raining and it probably isn't raining. implore one to enter into an incoherent state of mind, and thus are expected to be defective.
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Desideratum 2: explaining assertability and disagreement
We observed above that if epistemic modal claims are factual descriptions of evidence or evidential states, the question arises what evidence or evidential states is at issue in the case of any given claim; and it is obscure how to settle that question consistent with the actual assertability and disagreement facts surrounding these claims.
28 So a substitution instance of 'Ax' might be (something designating the words) 'Rem believes'; and a substitution instance of 'A w x ' might be 'Rem's resolution-indexed doxastic space in w'-where again, the latter designates a triple Π, π, P r .
29 Proof: For notational simplicity, abbreviate A w x as A. Then from the definitions above, and from the standard definitions for conjunction and negation, we have:
Ax(φ ∧ ¬φ) c,i,w is true iff ∀w ∈ π A : (φ ∧ ¬φ) c,A,w is true iff ∀w ∈ π A : φ c,A,w is true and ¬φ c,A,w is true iff ∀w ∈ π A : φ c,A,w is true and ∃w ∈ π A : ¬φ c,A,w is true iff (∀w ∈ π A : φ c,A,w is true) and (∃w ∈ π A : ¬φ c,A,w is true)
The two conjuncts of the last line impose incompatible demands on the attitude state A in question: obviously, no A is such that it both (1) includes only φ-possibilities and (2) includes some ¬φ-possibility. Thus ascriptions of epistemic contradictions are at best true only of absurd states of mind, states of minds that leave open no possibilities at all. One can perform formally analogous reasoning for (φ∧ ¬φ), (φ∧ ¬φ), (¬φ∧ φ), etc.-constructions also plausibly called epistemic contradictions. The imperatives (4) and (5) are thus defective because they ask one to enter into a patently incoherent state of mind.
Again, we get clear here by stepping back and understanding what it is to be in state of mind accepting an epistemic modal claim. Suppose I say (12) It is probably raining in Topeka.
in a standard belief-communicating context, where the conversational tone is belief. You agree with my claim.
In virtue of what do we agree? In virtue of our doxastic states mapping the context resolution to doxastic spaces which make rain in Topeka probable. Similarly, mutatis mutandis, for φ and φ.
Notice that this feature of our states of mind, this feature we agree on, involves no proposition about evidence or evidential states. This is as it should be. It explains why we may agree that it is probably raining in Topeka, while simultaneously rejecting each other's grounds for believing that it is probably raining. When we agree on (12), we are not agreeing on what is probable according to some body of evidence X ; indeed we might disagree about what is probable according to X for nearly all X. We are simply agreeing to coordinate our probabilistically articulated states of mind with respect to the probability our states confer on the proposition that it's raining in Topeka.
When is an epistemic modal claim assertable (or rejectable) for an agent in a context? Take the attitude that is the conversational tone of the discourse and find the agent's information space for this attitude with respect to the context resolution. Then the claim is assertable for the agent just in case this resolutionindexed information space satisfies the property semantically expressed by the epistemic modal clause in context. Conversely, the claim is rejectable for the agent just in case this resolution-indexed information space does not satisfy the property semantically expressed by the epistemic modal clause in context. This view about what makes for the assertability of epistemic modal claims allows us to see the disagreement facts about epistemic modal claims as rational. We needn't picture the speaker as claiming to speak for a body of evidence outside his own knowledge, in the way descriptivism is compelled to; and yet we can say how others may be in position to disagree with the speaker's claim.
Desideratum 3: explaining conflicting intuitions
We observed above that we tend to have conflicting intuitions about the truth value of an epistemic modal claim when we are outside the discourse context and in a better epistemic position (with the respect to the epistemically modalized proposition) than those within the discourse. When Expert B says 'Fat Tony might be dead' in the scenario envisaged earlier, it is not clear what truth value the claim deserves.
The reason it is not clear, I suggest, is that Expert B's speech act does not serve to describe the world. There is no way the world could be, or could fail to be, which would settle the question of the truth of the sentence. For this sentence there is no answering the question, (T) Is the speech act true in the sense that its factualist truth-conditions characterize the actual world?
for it has a false presupposition. His utterance does not have factualist truthconditions. The point of the speech act on the story I recommend is, again, to engender coordination among one's interlocutors with respect to the property of states of mind the sentence semantically expresses in context. When assessing this kind of speech act for correctness, we cannot ask (T). At best we ask one of two things:
(R) Is the speech act rational in the sense that someone equipped with the evidence of the speaker would be responding appropriately to the evidence by accepting the content of the speech act?
(A) Is the speech act advisable in the sense that a person equipped with full information about the relevant situation would be responding appropriately to that information by accepting the content of the speech act?
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Given this distinction, it is easy to see that Expert B's speech act was rational but inadvisable. His state of mind responded correctly to the evidence, but it is not the state of mind we would recommend to him given our superior epistemic position. When we are asked about the truth value of claim in a given context, typically we understand the question to be (T). But where the claim is epistemically modalized, that question cannot arise. We therefore look for other criteria to assess the sentence for correctness; and the two kinds of features we check for instead, I suggest, are rationality and advisability. When ordinary speakers are asked, 'Is what Expert B said true?' some of them interpret the question as (R), and they answer 'yes'. Others interpret the question as (A), and they answer 'no'. Still others feel the intuitive pull of both interpretations. These enlightened subjects reject the question and say: 'Look: Expert B was right to say what he did, given what he knows. But if he were to say that to me, I'd reject it, because I know the facts of the case.' These speakers tacitly recognize that, as far as the correctness of the speech act goes, we can ask either of (R) or (A), but that no further question (T) arises.
The expressivist view of epistemic modal discourse I have put forward satisfies desiderata (i)-(v). Descriptivism does not. The expressivist view wins.
On expressivism and nonfactualism
In metaethics, the name 'expressivism' is sometimes attached to a cluster of theses to the effect that normative claims are fancy riffs on 'Boo!' and 'Yay!'-that they are essentially yelps in linguistic dress, primarily 'expressing' some non-contentful attitudes pro and con and having no compositional semantics.
That view-perhaps better called emotivism-seems to me to be implausible, and I hope it is clear that the theory I have defended has not much in common with it. Far from trying to avoid content, I have suggested that careful attention to epistemic modal thought and talk require us to enrich our representations of contentful states of mind, to see them as resolution-sensitive and probabilistically articulated. In this respect, my proposal resembles that of Gibbard [1986 Gibbard [ , 1990 Gibbard [ , 2003 ], whose approach-in some moods, at least-has been to understand normative discourse as calling for a richer kind of content. Semantically, both Gibbard and I propose that the informational content of a sentential clause relative to context may serve to place conditions, not merely on possible worlds, but on a further nonfactualist parameter, one not corresponding to an objective feature of context.
31 And pragmatically, we both emphasize that the point in uttering sentences with the semantics we recommend is to engender coordination on the corresponding states of mind. (It should be obvious, however, that my view is not noncognitivist : I do not deny that epistemic modal claims can serve to express doxastic states.) In a sense, I go further than Gibbard from a semantic point of view, since he provides no detailed semantic analysis of deontic modals, no analysis which might parallel the semantics for epistemic modals given above.
The distinctive feature of expressivism about some fragment of languageor any rate, expressivism in what seems to me its most plausible form-is the denial that the sentences of the fragment semantically have factualist truthconditions relative to context. It is not the denial of the view that the sentences can have truth values, where 'truth' is understood to refer to the technical notion deployed in the semantics. Epistemic modal clauses may perfectly well be true in the technical sense, i.e., as far as the recursive definition of truth at a point of evaluation in the semantics goes. What matters is that they are not 'true' in the sense of question (T) above: such clauses do not deliver factualist truth-conditions, and as a result they do not serve to describe the world.
I have presupposed in all this that the notion of describing the world is in reasonably good health, and moreover that I can technically approximate this notion with truth-conditions stated via metaphysically possible worlds. This, of course, may be seem to beg the question against more ambitious varieties of nonfactualism about modality (e.g., Blackburn [1986] ). As I see it, my conception of factualism definitionally excludes the possibility of nonfactualism (or anti-realism, or quasi-realism) about metaphysical modality in general, for I deploy a 'robust' notion of the metaphysical modality in saying what factualism is. I think this is the right methodological course. It seems to me doubtful there is some more attractive, more metaphysically neutral way to state, with useful precision, the question of factualism about epistemic modality; and anti/quasirealism about the modalities in general has, in my view, not much promise. But I can't fully justify these attitudes here.
